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SENTENCING STUDY
Sentencing constitutes the critical connection between the criminal
law and the penal system. Therefore, any analysis of sentencing involves fundamental and perplexing questions about the purposes and
problems of the criminal justice system. This comment will focus on
one of those problems: the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing.'
The majority of the literature on sentencing has suffered from the
limitation that it is largely speculative with respect to important empirically measurable factors. 2 Nevertheless, the quality of empirical
studies on discretion and disparity in sentencing is improving, and the
number of such studies is increasing.3 This study attempts to add to
the accumulating information by examining one measurable factor:
the sentencing patterns of judges of the Superior Court for King
County in and for the State of Washington.
If criminal sentences are to be equitably individualized, identification of the factors used in sentencing is necessary to determine when
one individual is punished differently than another. The purpose of
this study is to identify such factors and determine whether universally
applied standards exist among the judges surveyed.
JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN SENTENCING AND
PROPOSALS FOR ITS CONTROL

I.

The issue of the appropriate exercise and control of discretion in
sentencing is but one aspect of the multifaceted problem of discretion
permeating the criminal justice system.4 It seems clear, however, that
I. This comment does not attempt to analyze sentencing in terms of its philosophical or humanitarian justifications. For a recent consideration of the purposes of sentencing see Harris, Disquisition on the Need for a New Model for Criminal Sanctioning Systems, 77 W. VA. L. REV. 263 (1975).
2. For a discussion of this problem see E. GREEN, JUDICIAL ATTITUDES IN SENTENC-

ING 8-20 (1961); E. Cellar, An Expression of Congressional Interest in the Federal
Sentencing Institute, July 16-17, 1959 (presented before the Judicial Conference of

the United States Pilot Institute on Sentencing), in 26 F.R.D. 231, 243 (1960).
3. See, e.g., Johnson, Sentencing in the Criminal District Courts, 9 HOUSTON L.
REV. 944 (1972); Comment, Texas Sentencing Practices:A Statistical Study, 45 TEXAS
L. REV. 471 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Texas Sentencing]; Comment, Discretion in
Felony Sentencing--A Study of Influencing Factors, 48 WASH. L. REV. 857 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Study of Influencing Factors].

4.

Discretionary decisionmaking begins with the decision to arrest and continues

through indictment, arraignment, bail setting, trial, sentencing, post-trial appeal, and
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in no other area is discretion as broad and unguided as it is in sentencing. 5 The problem is complicated by the fact that increased
concern with rehabilitation within the penal system has resulted in an
increasing number of sentencing options designed to provide more
individualized sentences.
Such wide-ranging discretion has not always existed. Under pre19th century English common law, virtually all offenses carried mandatory sentences; thus, there was little need for either the exercise or
control of judicial discretion in sentencing. 6 The early federal system
started with the assumption that Congress should control sentencing
through the structure of the penal code.7 Today there is considerable
disagreement on the issue of whether discretion should be limited by
8
the legislature.
parole. See Motley, "Law and Order" and the Criminal Justice System, 64 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 259 (1973); Rosett, Discretion, Severity and Legality in Criminal
Justice, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 12 (1972). For an analysis of discretion which results in
the diversion of persons from the criminal justice system see Brakel, Diversion front
the Criminal Process: Informal Discretion, Motivation, and Formalization, 48 DENVER
L.J. 211 (197 1).For a detailed review of police discretion in the search and seizure
context see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.

349, 414-16 (1974). For discussion of prosecutorial discretion see Abrams. Prosecutorial Charge Decision Systems, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REV. I (1975); LaFave, The Prosecttor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532 (1970); Thorne. The
Rural Prosecutor and the Exercise of Discretion, 12 CRIM. L. BULL. 301 (1976); Work.
Richman & Williams, Toward a Fairer Systenm of Justice: The Impact of Technology
oniProsecutorial Discretion, 12 CRIM. L. BULL. 289 (1976); Comment, Prosecutorial
Discretion in the Duplicative Statutes Setting, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 455 (1971). For
analysis of sentencing discretion see Harris, supra note 1.
5. "Each time a criminal sanction is imposed, the sentencing judge must decide
the purposes to be served, the available sentencing options to be chosen, and the criteria to be taken into account." Harris, supra note I. at 265. Another commentator
states:
The sentencing powers of the judges are, in short, so far unconfined that, except
for frequently monstrous maximum limits, they are effectively subject to no law
at all. Everyone with the least training in law would be prompt to denounce a
statute that merely said the penalty for crimes "shall be any term the judge sees
fit to impose." A regime of such arbitrary fiat would be intolerable in a supposedly
free society, to say nothing of being invalid under our due-process clause. But the
fact is that we have accepted unthinkingly a criminal code creating in effect precisely that degree of unbridled power.
M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 8 (1973).

6. R. Connor, The Legal Framework for Sentencing, July 16-17, 1959 (presented
before the Judicial Conference of the United States Pilot Institute on Sentencing), in
26 F.R.D. 231, 258-59 (1960).
7. Introductory Remarks by Judge William J. Campbell, Judicial Conference of
the United States Pilot Institute on Sentencing, July 16-17, 1959, in 26 F.R.D. 231,
257 (1960).
8. Contrast AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE (1971) (proposal to eliminate judicial discretion by providing for short mandatory sentences set by
the legislature) with Comment, Sentencing Patterns in the Northern District of Ala-
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In the last 20 years there has been a plethora of proposals for controlling judicial discretion. Most of these proposals favor retaining
sufficient judicial discretion to allow for individualized sentences, but
are designed to reduce the inequities resulting from broad discretion
by the use or development of judicial guidelines for sentencing.9
Typical of recent proposals for control of discretion in sentencing is
the statutory scheme set forth in the Final Report of the National
Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws.10 This proposed
federal code initially limits discretion by dividing felonies and misdemeanors into classes according to the gravity of the offense and by set-

ting a maximum penalty which may be imposed for a particular
class.1 1 The code further provides specific criteria which must be satisfied before a sentence of imprisonment may be imposed and sets forth
14 specific factors which "shall be accorded weight" in making the
decision on imprisonment. 12 The development of factors or criteria
that will guide sentencing behavior and thereby reduce discretion also
13
is explicit in other proposals.
baina: An Empirical Study, 5 CUMB.-SAM. L. REV. 88 (1974) (reaffirming the importance ofjudicial wisdom and experience in setting a just sentence).
9. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES (Approved
Draft 1968); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES (Approved Draft 1968); ADVISORY COUNCIL OF JUDGES, NATIONAL PROBATION &
PAROLE ASS'N, GUIDES FOR SENTENCING (1957); MODEL PENAL CODE art. 7 (1962);
NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT (1971). But see
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 8. Although acknowledging that some injustices would result, this report argues that on the whole less inequity would result,
especially for oppressed groups, if short mandatory sentences dependent only on the
nature of the crime were uniformly imposed. For discussion favoring a drastic reduction in judicial discretion see Motley, supra note 4.
10. NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT (1971).
See also NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, STUDY DRAFT OF A
NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1970); NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS (1970).
11. FINAL REPORT, supra note 10, §§ 3001, 3201-02, 3601.
12. Id. § 3101. The basic reason for including such legislatively stated criteria is to
reduce the problem of disparity in sentencing: "Judges who can discern the policy of
Congress from a sentencing statute are far less likely to impose wildly different sentences
in comparable cases." 2 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 10, at 1300.
13. For example, the ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice has
recommended the use of sentencing councils in which a number of judges jointly
would discuss the appropriate disposition for each case. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO
SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 7.1, at 294-98 (Approved Draft 1968).
This proposal is similar to 28 U.S.C. § 334 (1970), which since 1958 has provided for
nationwide sentencing institutes. One of the goals of the institute is "the formulation of
sentencing principles and criteria which will assist in promoting the equitable administration of the criminal laws of the United States." Id. § 334(a)(5). In addition, each
of the following proposals has adopted the method of listing specific factors to be
weighed at the time of sentencing: MODEL PENAL CODE art. 7 (1962); GUIDES FOR SENTENCING, supra note 9.
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Those who support maintaining discretionary sentencing rely primarily on the proposition that only through discretion can a sentence
be tailored to meet the individual circumstances of the offense, the
offender, and the community.1 4 As there is currently no doubt that the
individualized approach to sentencing predominates, 15 the question
which arises is: What individual factors are determinative in discretionary judicial sentencing?
The utility of these proposals is difficult to evaluate without empirical information from which the strengths and shortcomings of the
sentencing process can be examined. Furthermore, the results
achieved under any new system cannot be fully understood in the absence of data regarding the present sentencing structure; the benefits
of change cannot be measured accurately without reference to a defined starting point. Therefore, empirical studies are essential to the
formulation, review, and revision of sentencing policy.
II.

PREVIOUS STUDIES OF SENTENCING

Most of the earlier studies of sentencing have been aimed at those
aspects of discretion which result in disparity of treatment. 16 "[B] ecause equal treatment of those similarly situated with respect to the
issue before the court is a deep implicit expectation of the legal order," 7 sentencing practices which appear to violate this principle
have been vigorously attacked. Nevertheless, the question of whether
widespread disparity exists in sentencing has not been answered by the
empirical literature as clearly as some commentators have assumed. 18
The earliest studies, which purported to document disparity in sen14. Harris, supra note 1,at 273.
15. M. FRANKEL, supra note 5, at 10; Recent Development, Sentencing: Disparity,
Inconsistency, and a New Federal Criminal Code, 20 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 748, 752
(1971); see Introductory Remarks by Judge William J. Campbell, Judicial Conference
of the United States Pilot Institute on Sentencing, July 16-17, 1959, in 26 F.R.D. 231.
257 (1960).
16. These earlier studies have been extensively reviewed and criticized. See E.
GREEN, supra note 2; Hindelang, Equality Under the Law, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
306 (1969); Mannheim, Some Aspects of Judicial Sentencing Policy, 67 YALE L.J. 961,
970; Study of Influencing Factors, supra note 3. For a listing of early studies on sentencing disparity see Institute of Judicial Administration, Disparity in Sentencing
Offenders, April 7, 1954.
17.

E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 14 (1949).

18. See, e.g., Rubin, Disparity and Equality of Sentences-A Constitutional Challenge, 40 F.R.D. 55 (1967); Statement by Congressman Edwin E. Willis, Judicial
Conference of the United States Pilot Institute on Sentencing, July 16-17. 1959. in 26
F.R.D. 231, 248-49 (1960).
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tencing, tended simply to tabulate large samples of cases, erroneously
assuming that the cases would be randomly distributed among the
judges studied.' 9 The failure to account for differences in distribution
of offenses and offenders and other methodological shortcomings
20
make the conclusions of these studies suspect. More recent studies
have corrected many of these shortcomings, and to that extent a body
of reliable findings is emerging.
An important observation regarding previous studies is that their
findings have been strikingly inconsistent. 21 Although this inconsis19. For a detailed analysis of the methodological shortcomings of much early empirical sentencing research see E. GREEN, supra note 2, at 8.
20. See note 3 supra.
21. For example, race has been one of the most widely studied variables. Studies
support each of the following inconsistent hypotheses:
(1) Race is not a factor at all. R. BENSING & 0. SCHROEDER, HOMICIDE IN AN URBAN COMMUNITY (1960); E. GREEN, supra note 2, at 56-62; Seymour, 1972 Sentencing Study for the Southern District of New York, 45 N.Y.S.B.J. 163 (1973);
Texas Sentencing, supra note 3.
(2) Race is a factor operating to discriminate against blacks. Bullock, Significance
of the Racial Factor in the Length of Prison Sentences, 52 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
411 (1961); Vines & Jacob, Studies in Judicial Politics; 8 TUL. STUDIES POL. SCI.
93 (1962).
(3) Race is a factor operating to discriminate against whites. Study of Influencing Factors,supranote 3.
(4) Race is a factor discriminating against blacks only in certain circumstances.
Garfinkel, Research Note on Inter-and Intra-RacialHomicides, 27 SOCIAL FORCES
369 (1949); Johnson, The Negro and Crime, 217 ANNALS 93 (1941).
(5) Race is a factor in some regions but not in others. Hindelang, supra note 16
(article includes a review of many earlier studies).
Numerous other variables have been the subjects of disparity studies as well. Many
of the studies are in apparent conflict, although it should be noted that comparison
of results is complicated by differences in definition, scope, and methodological approach.
The significance of the following variables has been evaluated:
(1) The judge was a significant factor. S. WARNER & H. CABOT, JUDGES AND LAW
REFORM (1936); Everson, The Human Element in Justice, 10 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 90 (1919); McGuire & Holtzoff, The Problem of Sentence in the
Criminal Law, 20 BOST. U.L. REv. 423 (1940); Seymour, supra; Study of Influencing Factors, supra note 3. Contra, E. GREEN, supra note 2; Comment, supra
note 8.
(2) The prosecutor was a significant factor. Johnson, supra note 3. Contra, E.
GREEN, supra note 2.
(3) Whether the defendant's guilt was determined by plea or by trial was not significant. E. GREEN, supra note 2; Texas Sentencing, supra note 3; Study of Influencing Factors,supra note 3.
(4) The type of offense was significant. E. GREEN, supra note 2; Seymour, supra;
Texas Sentencing, supra note 3; Study of Influencing Factors,supra note 3.
(5) Defendant's prior criminal record was significant. E. GREEN, supra note 2;
Texas Sentencing, supra note 3; Study of Influencing Factors,supra note 3. Contra,Johnson, supra note 3.
(6) Defendant's marital status was not significant. Texas Sentencing, supra note 3;
Study of lnfluencing Factors,supranote 3.
(7) Defendant's sex was significant. 0. POLLAK, THE CRIMINALITY OF WOMEN
(1950); Texas Sentencing, supra note 3. Contra, E. GREEN, supra note 2; Study

107

Washington Law Review

Vol. 52: 103, 1976

tency has been partially explained in terms of the early studies' methodological shortcomings, 22 it also may be accounted for in part by the
studies' temporal and regional differences. The latter limitations apply
to the instant study and suggest that one should hesitate to generalize
from findings derived from King County judges in 1973-74. The present study, however, does attempt to bring some clarity to the issue of
how sentencing factors interrelate, at least with respect to King
County superior court judges. In this way it is hoped that this study
will contribute to the developing body of empirical information about
the sentencing process. Ultimately such information should be capable
of providing significant direction to the search for more effective sentencing standards.
III.

THE PRESENT STUDY'S PROCEDURE AND
RESULTS

In this study, sentences and 48 variables 23 believed to affect senof Inflaencing Factors,supra note 3.
(8) Defendant's age was not significant. E. GREEN, supra note 2; Texas Sentencing,
supra note 3; Study of Influencing Factors,supra note 3.
22. See E. GREEN, supra note 2, at 8; Study of Influencing Factors, supra note 3.
at 861.
23. The court files of the 432 cases were the source of data for this study. The
selection of 48 variables from this data was based upon a preliminary search of prior
studies, discussions with judicial consultants, and the authors' intuition. These variables were used as predictors of the sentencing outcome.
The technique used to analyze the data was multiple regression analysis. See note 28
infra. One of the requirements of multiple regression is that the variables analyzed be
independent of each other, i.e., not correlated with other variables. The degree of
dependence or independence is measured by a correlation coefficient. Correlation coefficients indicate the degree to which variation or change in one variable is related to
variation in another, summarizing the strength of association between a pair of variables. See Gordon, Issues in Multiple Regression, 73 AM. J. Soc. 592 (1968).
When some or all of the independent variables are multicolinear (an intercorrelation
of .80 or more is considered multicolinear). problems in interpretation result. Therefore, in order to perform multiple regression analysis, it is necessary to eliminate the
highly correlated variables. For example, if the variables of prior felony conviction and
prior prison record have a correlation coefficient of .80 (indicating a 64% overlap of
the two variables), then it would be improper to enter both of these factors in the
regression equation.
This study used factor analysis to check for multicolinearity. Factor analysis techniques enable one to determine whether some underlying pattern of relationship exists
such that some groups of individual variables may be more parsimoniously accounted
for by an underlying "source factor." In so doing, this technique shows which individual components of a source factor are so highly intercorrelated that they are multicolinear. In the present study, 28 of the 48 original variables were found to be multicolinear.
When multicolinearity exists, the two acceptable methods of proceeding such that
multiple regression can be performed are to "(I) create a new variable which is a com-
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tencing were recorded from judges' files of 432 grand larceny 24 and
Uniform Controlled Substances Act (UCSA)2 5 cases decided by 19 of
24 King County superior court judges between March 1973 and May
1974.26 The study focuses on the influence that these various factors
posite scale of the set of highly intercorrelated variables and use the new scale variable
in the regression equation in place of its components, or (2) use only one of the variables in the highly correlated set to represent the common underlying dimension." N.
NIE, C. HULL, J. JENKINS, K. STEINBRENNER & D. BENT, STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 341 (2d ed. 1975). The authors selected the latter solution to the
problem. Factor analysis of the 28 multicolinear variables produced eight "factors" or
clusters. Each of the variables within a cluster was highly interrelated, but they were
not highly interrelated with variables of other clusters. We chose one variable from
each of the following clusters to represent the group:
(I) Felony history: Number of prior felony convictions, number of prior felony
arrests, most recent felony arrest, most recent prior felony conviction, seriousness
of most recent prior felony conviction, prior prison record, prior probation or
parole. Number of prior felony convictions was selected as the variable to represent this group.
(2) Misdemeanor history: Number of prior misdemeanor convictions, number of
prior misdemeanor arrests, most recent prior misdemeanor arrest. Number of
prior misdemeanor convictions was selected as the variable to represent this group.
(3) Felony counts: Number of counts dropped by prosecutor, number of counts
originally filed. Number of counts dropped by prosecutor was selected as the variable to represent this group.
(4) Employment history: Regular employment in the past, employment at the
time of the crime. Regular employment in the past was selected as the variable
to represent this group.
(5) History of drug problems: Previous commitment to a special program, prior
involvement in a drug rehabilitation program, history of drug addiction, value of
drugs seized at time of arrest. Previous commitment to a special program was
selected as the variable to represent this group.
(6) Family relationship: Married at the time of the offense, number of dependents. Married at the time of the offense was selected as the variable to represent this group.
(7) Psychiatric history: History of prior psychiatric care, history of severe emotional problems. History of prior psychiatric care was selected as the variable to
represent this group.
(8) Miscellaneous: Number of misdemeanor counts, number of misdemeanor
counts originally charged, number of letters of recommendation, nature of pretrial custody, pleaded guilty. Pleaded guilty was selected as the variable to represent this group.
The 20 independent variables which were not found to be multicolinear were as follows: age, sex, race, length of time in the State of Washington, prior alcoholic history,
extent of current drug use, education, prior juvenile record, type of crime committed,
conviction related to ongoing criminal activity, prior jail record, value of property
acquired in larceny, weapon involved in the offense, defendant drunk at the time of
the crime, defendant on drugs at time of offense, defendant sold drugs to a government
agent, defendant was on probation or parole at the time of the crime, defense counsel
was private or public defender, type of grand larceny, and nature of the victim of
grand larceny.
24. Ch. 97, § I, [1953] Wash. Laws 497 (codified at WASH. REv. CODE §
9.54.090 (1974), repealed effective July 1, 1976).
25. WASH. REv. CODE ch. 69.50 (1974). The cases under this statute involved
drug violations.
26. The 432 cases represent all grand larceny and UCSA cases decided by these
judges during this time, with the exception of a few cases with incomplete files
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had upon the judge's sentencing decision. 27 Thus, the methodology
employed in evaluating the data collected 28 is aimed at identifying the
(less than 3%). Of the five judges not participating in the study, four were unavailable for participation at the time the data was collected, and one declined to participate.
The basic paradigm for this approach was suggested in an earlier study by the
Washington State Superior Court Judges' Association. Washington State Super. Ct.
Judges' Ass'n, Factors Affecting Judicial Discretion in Felony Sentencing in Washington State, June-Sept. 1971 [hereinafter cited as WSSCJA Study]. The WSSCJA
study differs from the present study in that the former focused on one crimegrand larceny-and relied upon hypothetical cases.
The selection of grand larceny and UCSA cases in the instant study was the result of a number of considerations. First, the desire to permit comparison of the
hypothetical case results of the WSSCJA study to actual cases suggested that this
study include the subject of that study, grand larceny. Secondly, inclusion of the
additional offense-UCSA violations-was based upon what was perceived to be
a significant difference in the nature of the offense. UCSA violations are widely
regarded to be "victimless crimes," while grand larceny violations are not. Thus.
the authors were interested in examining sentencing patterns in the two crimes to
evaluate the impact of this distinction. Thirdly. the relatively high frequency of
occurrence of grand larceny and UCSA offenses provides a sufficient number of
cases for statistical reliability while avoiding the potential problems of interpretation arising from extending the study over a long period of time. Finally. the decision to use nonhypothetical cases was based upon the belief that actual cases best
demonstrate the factors that actually control sentencing decisions and reflect sentencing practice rather than philosophical judicial attitudes and opinion. This contrasts sharply with the WSSCJA study, which was presented as a study of the factors which judges believe should control sentencing.
27. For an explanation of the sentencing alternatives which a Washington trial
judge has upon conviction of the defendant see Comment. A Perspective on Adult
Corrections in Washington, 51 WASH. L. REV. 495, 496-502 (1976). See also Ringold, A Judge's Personal Perspective on Criminal Sentencing, 51 WASH. L. REV.
631,632-34 (1976).
The maximum term of imprisonment for grand larceny was 15 years. Ch. 97. §
I,

[1953]

Wash.

Laws

497

(codified

at

WASH.

REV.

CODE

§

9.54.090

(1974), repealed effective July 1, 1976). The maximum term for violation of the
UCSA may be ten, five, or two years, depending on the drug involved. Distribution
to minors or commission of second and subsequent offenses can double the applicable maximum term. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 69.50.401-.410 (1974). None of the
offenders in this study, however, were charged under the distribution to minors or
second and subsequent offenses provisions.
For purposes of this study, the sentence in each case was recorded as one of the
following: (1) probation (including suspended sentences and special programs not
involving incarceration); (2) jail and probation; or (3) prison.
28. The data collected from the judges' files were analyzed to determine which
of the objective variables were most influential in sentencing dispositions. The
method of multiple regression used was that outlined in N. NIE, C. HULL, J. JENKINS, K. STEINBRENNER & D. BENT, STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
(2d ed. 1975). Multiple regression is a general statistical technique utilized to examine the relationship between a dependent or criterion variable (the sentence) and a
set of independent or predictor variables (the 28 variables in this study). It produces a succinct measure of the predictive capacity of the independent variables'
influence on the dependent variable. In multiple regression, a model is constructed
that will minimize the error in predicting the dependent variable:
Y = BIX 1 +

B 2X2 + ...

+ BnXn + A

where Y represents the value of the dependent variable, and the X's represent the
independent variables. The B's, referred to as regression (or beta) coefficients, rep-
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relationship between characteristics of the defendant population and
sentence dispositions.
The typical defendant in this study was white (75%), unmarried
(77%), unemployed (56%), male (74%), under 30 years of age
(72%), with no juvenile record (73%), and no prior felony convictions (78%). Almost all defendants (99%) pleaded guilty. Approximately one-half (48%) were guilty of UCSA violations and one-half
(52%) of grand larceny. Most defendants (73.4%) were placed on
probation, while a lesser number (20%) were sentenced to jail and
probation, and fewer still (6.5%) were given prison terms.
The original statistical analysis that was applied to the data gathered produced a model with a low predictive capacity. 29 The authors
then proceeded to a second analysis, dividing the judges into discrete
groups based upon their individual tendencies to sentence to proba-

tion or incarceration. 30 Four groups emerged from this analysis: 31

resent the change in Y (the sentence) with a change of one unit in the X (the variable), holding all other variables constant. The A represents a constant added to
each case. A more extensive explanation of multiple regression can be found in H.
BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 429-64 (2d ed. 1972).
Since the dependent and independent variables were not measured in the same
units, they were standardized for correct interpretation. For instance, age was
measured as (1) 18-21; (2) 22-29; (3) 30-39; (4) 40-49; or (5) 50 and over.
Whether the defendant had been sentenced to a term in prison prior to his or her
present conviction was measured as (1) prior sentence or (2) no prior sentence.
Standardization allows direct comparison of the regression coefficients (beta coefficients or weights). Because the 432 cases used in the analysis represent the entire population of cases available for that time period, treating them as a sample
which may be generalized to a population is not appropriate. Therefore, tests of
statistical significance will not help in distinguishing significant beta weights from
nonsignificant ones. Thus, those independent variables to which regression analysis
assigns the highest beta weight are more influential in term5 of predicting the
sentencing outcome than variables with lower beta weights.
29. To evaluate the accuracy of the prediction equation, we examined the
squared multiple correlation coefficient (R2), which reflects the proportion of explained variation between the sentence predicted by the regression equation and the
actual sentence in each case. The R2 for the first regression run across all judges
was low (.256); thus, little confidence could be placed in the sentencing model produced by analysis of all judges simultaneously. This is consistent with the results
of the WSSCJA Study, supra note 26, at 37.
30. This study utilizes the suggestion of the WSSCJA Study, supra note 26, that
the best criterion for dividing judges into groups is according to their tendencies to
sentence to probation or incarceration. It was determined that the first multiple regression equation, which had been derived from the analysis of all judges, best approximated the norm for all judges. Therefore, they were grouped according to how much
and in what direction each judge's sentencing deviated from the sentences which the
first equation would have predicted.
31. The percentage of a judge's cases in which a defendant received either a
harsher or more lenient sentence than that predicted by the multiple regression
equation across all judges, see note 30 supra, was recorded for each judge. The percentage of sentences which were the same as predicted was also recorded. An in-
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(1) Those judges who tended to sentence to incarceration more often
than the norm (group I);
(2) Those judges who tended to sentence to probation more often than
the norm (group II);
(3) Those judges who tended to sentence most closely to the norm
(group III); and
(4) Those judges who neither conformed to the norm nor consistently
sentenced either to incarceration or to probation (group IV).

Separate analysis of each subgroup reveals a dramatic increase in
predictability, 32 indicating that there are distinct groups of judges
whose sentencing patterns were internally consistent. 33 But the varia-

tion and complexity of the patterns containing the most important
variables for each subgroup precludes sweeping generalizations; furthermore, the effect of many of the variables on sentencing is not
intuitively obvious. For example, prior experience in the criminal

justice system, although significant, was not of overwhelming importance. 34 Further, the divergence between the subgroups was so great
that no variable was significant in the same direction for all four
groups. The type of crime was significant for all groups, but it was a
variable weighted in favor of probation for only one group. Thus,

generalizations as to what variables are important in sentencing are
suspect if not limited to specific groups of judges.
Group I judges, those most likely to incarcerate, weighted the na-

ture and circumstances of the crime more heavily than any other
group. Further, a guilty plea was the most significant variable for
these judges. Of the ten most significant variables, six dealt with the
dex of deviation from the norm was compiled from these percentages. and the
judges were then grouped according to which of the four groups best represented
each judge's sentencing practice.
32. The R2 coefficient rose from .256 across all groups. see note 29 supra, to .549.
.699, .448, and .450 for groups I-IV respectively. For a discussion of how to interpret the squared multiple correlation coefficient see H. BLALOCK, supra note 28, at
354-57.
33. See Tables I-IV.
34. Several of the variables measured were directly related to the defendant's
prior experience with the criminal justice system: prior felony convictions, prior misdemeanor convictions, prior juvenile record, prior jail record, defendant on probation or parole at the time of the crime. See note 23 supra. Each of these variables
was found to be statistically significant; however, no group of judges found more
than three of the five variables among the ten most important variables in the sentencing process. Only one group of judges found more than one of these variables
to be among the five most important, while one group did not find any of the variables to be among the five most important. See Tables I-IV.
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nature and circumstances of the crime, 35 three represented socioeconomic factors (including race),3 6 and one represented prior criminality. 37 With regard to race, whites--not blacks-tended to be
discriminated against in sentencing.
TABLE I
GROUP I-TENDED TO INCARCERATE
R2 = .549
Number of judges = 3

Number of cases = 75
Beta Sign* Value*" Independent Variablet
-

+
+
+
+
+
-

+
+
+

1.010 Defendant pleaded guilty
.460 Defendant used drugs regularly
.366 The value of the goods or money involved in the grand
larceny was high
.348 Defendant was single, never married
.345 Type of crime was grand larceny
.310 Defendant was white
.309 Defendant was on drugs at the time of the offense
.295 Prior misdemeanor history
.237 A weapon was involved in offense
.229 Defendant sold drugs to government agent

* Each factor is assigned a negative or positive value which reflects the extent to
which that factor is weighted toward probation (-) or toward incarceration (+).
This value is the beta weight. The determination of the size and direction of the weights

is made through the regression analysis.
** Because the independent variables are ordinal rather than integral, the numeric
values given are more important in terms ol" their rank than their absolute value. For
example, a variable with a value of .600 does not mean that such a factor is twice as
important as a variable with a value of .300.
t Each table lists those independent variables which had the largest beta weights.
Other variables were statistically significant, but the authors have included only the
ten most significant factors for each group of judges.

Group II judges, those most apt to place persons convicted on probation, weighted socioeconomic background and prior experience
35. The six variables were as follows: type of crime was grand larceny; defendant pleaded guilty; value of the grand larceny was high; a weapon was involved
in offense; defendant sold drugs to a government agent; defendant was on drugs at
the time of the offense.
36. The socioeconomic variables were as follows: defendant used drugs regularly; defendant was single and had never married; defendant was white.
37. The prior criminality involved was a prior misdemeanor history.
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with the criminal justice system more heavily than the nature and circumstances of the crime. These judges weighted psychiatric history as
the second most important variable tending toward incarceration. Of
the ten most significant variables, three dealt with prior experience in
the criminal justice system, 38 while four dealt with the nature of the
crime.3 9 Socioeconomic background accounted for at least three of
the variables. 40 As to race, whites received less favorable sentencing
than other races.
The finding that as the value of the grand larceny increased, the
offender in group II cases was given a lower sentence, seems paradoxical. This result may be partially explainable, however, by the fact
that 20 percent of the grand larceny cases were for fraud. Ninety-eight
percent of the people convicted of welfare fraud were not incarcerated, 4 1 yet the value of the property obtained in such cases was almost
always high. Thus, the tendency to give lower sentences as the value
of property stolen increases may be partially attributable to the nature
of welfare fraud cases rather than to a conscious consideration of the
value of the larceny on the part of these judges.
TABLE 1I
GROUP 11-TENDED TO PROBATION
R 2 = .699
Number of judges = 4

Number of cases = 84
Beta Sign

Value

+
+
+
+
+

.458
.457
.261
.234
.224
.218

-

+
+
+
-

Independent Variable

Type of crime was grand larceny
Defendant had a history of psychiatric problems
On probation or parole at the time of the offense
Number of felony counts
Defendant was an alcoholic
Defendant was drunk at the time of the offense
.167 Prior felony history
.144 Defendant was white
.144 Defendant had previously been in jail
.141 The value of the goods or money involved in the grand
larceny was high

38. The variables were as follows: defendant was on probation or parole at time
of offense; prior felony history; defendant had previously been sentenced to a jail
term.
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Group III judges, those tending to sentence most closely to the
norm, were intermediate in terms of which types of variables they
treated as being most significant. They weighted the nature and circumstances of the offense more heavily than did group II, but more
lightly than did group 1.42 They weighted value of grand larceny in a
manner similar to group II but unlike group I, yet they treated the
selling of drugs to a government agent as a variable weighted toward
incarceration, as did group I. In addition, the variable ranked eleventh in importance by group III was the existence of a guilty plea, a
variable weighted most heavily by group I.
TABLE III
GROUP III-CLOSEST TO NORM
R2 = .448
Number ofjudges = 7
Number of cases = 132
Beta Sign

Value Independent Variable

+
+
+
-

.334
.298
.292
.240
.168

+
+
-

.162
.155
.154
.149
.138

-

Defendant was drunk at the time of the offense
Type of crime was grand larceny
Prior felony history
Defendant was on probation or parole at time of offense
The value of the goods or money involved in the grand
larceny was high
Defendant sold drugs to government agent
Type of crime was receiving stolen property
Defendant had a juvenile record
Defendant had spent little time in the state
Defendant was divorced

39. These variables were as follows: type of crime was grand larceny; number
of felony counts; defendant was drunk at the time of the offense; value of the
grand larceny was high.
40. Socioeconomic variables were as follows: defendant had a history of psychiatric problems; defendant was an alcoholic; defendant was white.
41. In almost all cases the offender received probation and was required to
make restitution. Welfare fraud offenders also tended to have no prior experience
with the criminal justice system, a factor probably contributing to the high probation rate.
42. Group III weighted the following five variables involving the nature and

circumstances of the offense: defendant was drunk at the time of the offense; type
of crime was grand larceny; the value of the grand larceny was high; defendant
sold drugs to a government agent; type of crime was receiving stolen property.

Group I weighted six such factors, and group II weighted four.
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Group IV judges, those neither conforming to the norm nor consistently deviant in either direction, were the only group of judges which
gave drug violators higher sentences than offenders convicted of
grand larceny. This tendency to incarcerate drug offenders is also reflected by the fact that a history of drug problems and selling drugs to
a government agent were both variables significantly weighted in
favor of incarceration. Of the ten most significant variables for this
43
group, four dealt with the nature and circumstances of the crime,
three with socioeconomic background, 44 and three with prior experience in the criminal justice system. 4 5 Value of grand larceny was
weighted in favor of incarceration, as it was by group I. Group IV
was the only group to weight history of regular employment as significant; such history was weighted in favor of probation.
TABLE IV
GROUP IV-NEITHER CONFORMED NOR TENDED
IN EITHER DIRECTION
R'-' = .450
Number of judges = 5
Number of cases = 136
Beta Sign

+
+
-

+
-

+
+
-

+

Value Independent Variable

.274 Defendant had a juvenile record
.256 The value of the goods or money involved in the grand
larceny was high
.239 History of drug abuse
.193 Defendant was male
.192 Defendant was employed regularly
.176 Type of crime was grand larceny
.171 Defendant sold drugs to government agent
.163 Defendant was on probation or parole at time of offense
.155 Defendant was drunk at time of offense
.130 Prior felony history

43. The variables were as follows: the value of the grand larceny was high:
type of crime was grand larceny; defendant sold drugs to a government agent:
defendant was drunk at time of offense.
44. The socioeconomic variables were as follows: history of drug abuse: defendant was male: defendant was employed regularly.
45. The variables were as follows: defendant had a juvenile record; defendant
was on probation or parole at time of offense; prior felony history.
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Finally, it should be noted that two of the four groups tended to sentence whites to incarceration more often than others, and that group
IV tended to sentence men to incarceration more often than women.
Thus, it appears that some offenders are receiving higher sentences
based upon immutable and constitutionally protected 46 characteristics. 47
IV.

CONCLUSION

Edward Green, one of the first commentators to review rigorously
and systematically empirical studies of sentencing, concluded his re48
view with the following comment:
The criticism of sentencing practices in the criminal courts shapes up
into a two-pronged offensive: one line of attack thrusts at the system
of criminal justice, and the other, at the allegedly erratic quality ofjustice dispensed by the system. The former is essentially a conflict of
values engendered by opposing correctional philosophies; the latter
involves primarily factual issues. The failure to separate these two
quarrels-the failure to distinguish between justice in the law and justice before the law-has resulted in many unfounded assertions concerning the sentencing practices of judges. The crux of the error is that
the criticism of sentencing practices is to a great extent deduced from
objections to the system of criminal justice rather than induced from
any sound factual basis.
This study has sought to clarify factual issues in the hope that those
concerned with creating a just sentencing system will be working from
a "sound factual basis."
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; WASH. CONST. art. XXXI. Discrimination on the
basis of race in the administration of the criminal justice system has been condemned
by the United States Supreme Court since Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Washington's specific addition of art. XXXI to the state constitution makes the prohibition of discrimination
on the basis of sex explicit. See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
47. This result is consistent with earlier studies supporting the folk wisdom that
legally irrelevant factors influence sentencing decisions. See E. GREEN, supra note
2 (race and sex both found significant influence); Johnson, supra note 3 (judge's
age had the highest correlation with sentence severity); A Study of the California
Penalty Jury in First-degree Murder-Cases, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1297 (1969) (nonwhite, poor job stability, and defendant asserted insanity defense all found significant); Texas Sentencing, supra note 3 (pretrial custody, retained or appointed
counsel, sex, and which trial court were all found significant); Study of Influencing Factors, supra note 3 (length of time since trial judge was admitted to the bar,
race, length of time judge was on the bench, and that judge had not attended law
school were found to be the most significant variables).
48. E. GREEN, supra note 2, at 20.
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The findings indicate that no single set of standards for sentencing
is followed by all the judges that participated in the study. Rather,
four sentencing patterns emerged. Contrary to the findings of some
prior studies and much folk wisdom, the results of this study indicate
that judges do sentence according to standards, although different
judges employ different standards. Thus, disparity in sentencing seems
to be the result of differences in judicial philosophy rather than of arbitrary decisionmaking.
With regard to recent proposals designed to control judicial discretion in sentencing, these findings appear generally encouraging. Such
proposals impose two fundamentally different types of controls. One
type involves the elimination of discretion from all or part of the sentencing scheme. Establishing mandatory, absolute sentences for
particular crimes and setting maximum limits for certain crimes are
examples of this type. The other type of control attempts to guide
judicial discretion through the implementation of guidelines. A list of
factors to be considered in setting any sentence is an example of this
type. The underlying assumption of the latter approach is that if the
policy of the legislature were clear, judges would follow that policy in
49
sentencing and disparity would thereby be reduced.
Although sentencing in Washington currently occurs with little legislative guidance, 50 the guidance which has been provided supports
the notion that judges would follow legislative guidelines. The results
of this study indicate that all but five of the judges were more likely to
sentence to prison people convicted of grand larceny than people convicted of drug offenses. Assuming that the judges interpret the higher
maximum penalty set by the legislature for grand larceny 51 as an indication that it is a more serious offense, then judicial sentencing practice appears to comply with legislative policy.
In contrast, the finding that sex and race, legally improper criteria
to consider in sentencing, were significant for two of the four groups
of judges suggests that judges might not follow definitive legislative
guidelines. Thus, these judges either chose to ignore the legal irrelevance of these factors or, more likely, were unconsciously biased. In
49. See STUDY DRAFT OF A NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 10. §
3101, Comment; 2 WORKING PAPERS, supra note 10, at 1306-07.
50. The Washington legislature has not set forth any explicit or precise guidelines for judges to follow in sentencing, as the proposed federal code has done. See
text accompanying note 12 supra.
51.
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either case, it appears that legislative guidelines would not have a substantial effect on disparity resulting from such criteria. This conclusion, however, is subject to two reservations. First, it may be that such
biases, if unconscious, would not operate as strongly if judges were
sentencing according to specific and detailed legislatively mandated
criteria. Secondly, if the judges were aware that such variables were
influencing their decisionmaking, they might be able to reduce the
influence of such factors through their own efforts.
Finally, it is important to note that the elimination of all judicial
discretion could simply change the type of disparity rather than eliminate it. For example, if the sentence were tied strictly to the nature of
the offense, offenders who were unequal in terms of their danger to
the community, or unequal in terms of mitigating or aggravating circumstances surrounding the offense, would be treated identically. If
the removal of all judicial discretion in sentencing would simply result
in treating disparate offenders equally, then one evil would simply
have been replaced by its converse. Disparity in sentencing exists
when equal things are treated unequally as well as when unequal
things are treated equally.
The extensive disparity documented by this study indicates that the
present sentencing system in King County is inequitable, because the
sentence received in many instances depends on which judge is doing
the sentencing. More importantly, however, this study suggests that
groups of judges consistently sentence according to common standards, even though all judges do not use the same standards.
Such consistent sentencing supports the rationale for establishing
legislative guidelines to restrict the range of judicial discretion. Legislatively imposed standards would establish uniform criteria among
sentencing judges. Assuming that judges would accept these substituted standards and weight them similarly, disparity in sentencing
would be greatly reduced.
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